• Agency costs, ownership structure, and governance shape financing outcomes and firm value, highlighting how ownership concentration, managerial incentives, and governance mechanisms affect capital structure, cash flow allocation, and value [1], [12], [11], [8], [10], [14].

• Capital structure determinants across theories and empirical tests reflect tax implications, contracting costs, information asymmetry, and instrument-specific effects, with several papers comparing theories and highlighting debt vs equity governance [2], [3], [9], [7], [4], [6].

• Market-based governance and ownership concentration emerge as central control devices; ownership structure and large shareholders influence governance outcomes, monitoring, and firm value via market for corporate control, governance arrangements, and remuneration [5], [11], [12], [8], [17], [18].

• Risk management and hedging are integral to corporate financing decisions, driven by taxes, contract costs, and information asymmetry; firms hedge to influence investment and financing outcomes, aligning value maximization with financing strategies [6], [4], [2], [9], [13].

• Corporate restructuring and going-private moves reflect governance incentives to mitigate agency problems and reallocate ownership; empirical work shows recontracting costs, value gains from reduced free cash flow problems, and reorganization outcomes [19], [14], [20].